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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
WESTERN GATEWAY STORAGE CO., 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
FRED G. TRESEDER and ANTONIA 
TRESEDER, his wife, and THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
* * * * * * * 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
14816 
This suit was filed by Western Gateway Storage Co., a Utah 
corporation, here called "Gateway", seeking to quiet title in itself 
to certain real property located in Ogden, Utah, free and clear of 
a claimed right of way owned by Appellants Treseder. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Trial was held July 29 and 30, 1976 before the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist sitting without a jury. Pursuant to a Memorandum 
Decision issued August 3, 1976, judgment was entered in favor of 
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Gateway and against Treseders and the United States of America on 
August 6, 1976. A motion for a new trial was filed and argued by 
Treseders and was denied September 29, 1976. In substance, the 
trial court held that Treseders had lost any right to the disputed 
area covered by the right of way. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants ask this court to reverse the findings and 
judgment of the trial court and to declare they still own a 
valid right of way over Gateway property. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gateway is a Utah corporation engaged in dry and refriger-
ated cold storage and warehousing. Since 1950, it has been doing 
business in a building it constructed in Ogden (R-150) located 
just west of Wall Avenue, a main north-south artery. Its 
building is on the north side of 28th Street, adjoining a 
railroad spur line. North of the Gateway property is an area 
approximately 240 feet wide and 130 deep, fronting on Doxey Street. 
For illustrative purposes, and not drawn to scale, are 2 
diagrams showing the lands. Figure 1 purports to show the proper-
ties as they were in 1949, when Gateway built its warehouse. The 
lands fronting Doxey had 6 nearly identical homes, all on narrow 
lots without driveway or garage. To the rear of each home was a 
coal shed (R-138, Ex. lBP). Access to the rear of the lots, for 
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delivery of coal, was by a two-way right of way shown on Figure 1. 
It is approximately 9 feet wide, goes south from Doxey (servicing 
the homes fronting on Wall Avenue as well), then curves to go 
west behind the homes, and then again north to Doxey. Doxey is a 
~ block street that terminates at railroad property and services 
only those lands abutting on the north and south side of Doxey. 
Apparently, from early days, the railroad owned at least 
the west 4 houses, and used them as housing for railroad employees 
(R-114). The coal trucks could enter one of the entrances from 
Doxey, get access to whichever of the 6 houses needed, and then 
proceed on out through the other entrance (or exit) without having 
to turn around or back up (R-138). Coal deliveries ended with the 
advent of gas heat to the neighborhood in 1956 (R-138, 48). 
During the years after 1956, the 4 houses on the west were 
razed as they were vacated. Ex. 18-P, a 1962 aerial photo, shows 
all 6 houses; 19-P, 1970, shows 4 houses: 20-P, 1975, has only the 
Treseder and Newcomb houses left. 
Figure 2 is intended to show the property as it was at time 
of trial. The entire area north of the original Gateway building 
and west of Treseder is vacant land, with no marked or improved 
right of way. The Newcomb and Treseder homes are marked N & T 
respectively. The area marked ROW is the original easement as it 
goes south from Doxey and west behind the 2 lots. This easement 
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was not challenged by the suit and is fully available to Treseder 
for any purpose of ingress or egress. The lined area is the bal-
ance of the original easement as it went west behind the railroad 
homes, and then north to Doxey. This is the area the trial court 
ruled upon. 
In 1975, Gateway purchased from the railroad company 
(Ex. 16-P) all of the land north of its building to Doxey Street, 
except for the Treseder and Newcomb lots. The property comprising 
the right of way is Gateway land, in addition to the vacant lands 
formerly occupied by the 4 railroad homes. Gateway proposes to 
use all of its land west of Treseder to build additional warehouse 
space (R-89, 90) connected to the existing building. If Treseder 
has a valid right of way from his property west (lined area of 
Fig. 2), Gateway cannot do so. 
The right of way under attack is limited to that portion 
west of Treseder. It is appurtenant to both the Newcomb and 
Treseder property, but none other. Newcomb did not contest vaca-
tion of the right of way, so the sole issue here presented is 
whether Treseder, the dominant estate, has lost the right to main· 
tain and use the lands to the west (lined area in Figure 2) for 
right of way purposes. 
The United States was joined as a co-defendant because of 
its mortgage on the Treseder lands, including the appurtenant 
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right of way. It appeared and participated at trial, but has 
not pursued appeal. 
The trial court found this right of way abandoned; 
also the changed conditions made it unjust and inequitable to 
require Gateway to keep the right of way open. Additional facts 
will be set out in the arguments. 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
FOUND THE EASEMENT ABANDONED 
Appellants' Brief, Pages 4 and 6, cited testimony as to 
use of the easement offered by Appellants' witnesses, ~nd most 
favorable to his side. There was substantial opposing testimony 
favorable to Gateway that is not referred to in that brief. As 
the trial court resolved the facts in Gateway's favor, it is en-
titled to have the evidence reviewed in the light most favorable 
to Gateway. Howarth v. Ostengard, 30 U. 2d 183, 515 P. 2d 444, (1973) 
Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 U. 2d 286, 495 P. 2d 811 (1972). 
James Devine, President of Gateway, testified he had been 
familiar with the property since 1949 when the building was erected. 
He also said storage regulations required a weekly perimeter inspec-
tion, and so on a weekly basis, he had looked at the area adjoining 
Gateway's building on the north, the right of way (R-82). He stated 
he never saw it used for access to the Treseder or other houses 
iR-82) and it never bore evidence of use. No one maintained it as 
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a right of way, and tor may years it was incapable of use because 
of telephone poles erected in the described easement (R-78) ; 
piles of junk and debris, growing trees in the easement, and an 
abandoned car that was left in it for over a year (Exhibits lP 
through 15P; R-80, 81). DeVine also stated he had never had a 
complaint from Treseder about the impassable condition of the 
right of way, and in fact, DeVine was unaware there was a right 
of way until after Gateway purchased the land (R-14) • (Of course, 
Gateway had constructive notice by reason of the record title 
of Treseder) • 
DeVine's testimony was corroborated and supported by 
several pictures taken of the area before it was cleaned up 
by Gateway, showing the impassable condition in detail. It 
was also supported by the testimony of George W. Carver, Dale 
P. Nay and Bill Perry, all of whom were familiar with the area 
on a daily basis for varying, but lengthy periods of time: 
Carver, 1949-1969; Nay 1972-present, and basic familiarity with 
the area from 1949-1972; Perry 1949-1968. None of these witnesses 
could recall seeing the right of way used since the era of coal 
deliveries. Nay estimated the Chinese Elm trees growing in the 
disputed area to be 5 to 8 years old, and up to 10 feet high 
(R-105, 107). The telephone poles blocking the right of way 
in the east-west portion have been there at least 7 years 
-6-
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(R-115, 84) • 
The trial court made findings regarding use of the 
disputed area in a Memorandum Decision as follows (R-38 and 39) : 
10. The sole use of the easement since 1956 by 
the defendants has been to occasionally take 
down a board fence and haul building supplies or 
large trash accumulations away. The fence 
bordering the easement has no gate, but there 
is a section which is approximately 6 feet 
high and 13 feet wide made of solid board, 
with three braces, that can be unnailed and 
lifted around to form an entrance way. This 
has been done only on limited occasions since 
1956. It was done the last time the house 
was remodeled, once to bring in building 
supplies and once to take them away. It 
was also done once when a tenant moved out 
and a new one moved in to haul away a large 
accumulation of trash. The Court does not 
believe that the easement has been used with 
a frequency of more than once every several 
years because of the great difficulty in 
opening the rear fence and then renailing it. 
14. The closing of the easement to the west 
will cause the defendants very slight incon-
venience. The use of this easement has been 
only on a basis of once every few years and 
could be made from either direction so long 
as the right-of-way is kept clear of cumula-
tive trash or other blockages such as old 
cars, etc. The Court believes that a study 
of the photographs in question and the growth 
of the foliage indicate that the easement has 
not been used for through traffic, that is all 
away around the "U", since it was used as a 
coal delivery passage. Some of the trees 
growing in the right-of-way are four inches 
in diameter, and there is no record of any 
snow having been removed from the right-of-way. 
These findings were fully supported, indeed compelled 
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by the evidence befoie the court. They also fully · t'f th JUS i y e 
holding of abandonment entered by the court. 
It is clear an easement, whether deeded · · or prescriptive, 
can be abandoned by the holder. Brown v. Oregon Short Line, 
36 u. 257, 102 P. 740 (1909); Anno. 25 A.L.R. 2d 1265. No 
particular length of time is essential to constitute abandonment, 
and non-user in itself does not constitute abandonment, but is 
persuasive evidence on the question of intention to abandon. 
Perry v. Carey, Ind. 1918, 119 N.E. 1010; Restatement, Property 
§ 504 (d). In addition to non-use, other facts consistent with 
intent to abandon and useful in determination thereof are allow-
ing the road to be blocked, Hatcher v. Chesner, (Pa. 1966), 221 
A. 2d 305; closing off access to the right of way from the dominam 
tenement, Dahnken v. George Romney & Sons, U. 1947, 111 U. 471, 
184 P. 2d 211; allowing the easement to become in a state of 
disrepair and unusable, Flanagan v. San Marcos Silk Co., (Col. 
1951 235 P. 2d 107; and change of conditions that eliminate the 
need for use of the easement, Brown v. Oregon Short Line, supra. 
All of these are present in our case. The way has, 
since 1956, not been used or maintained. A heavy board fence 
without a gate in it was erected by Treseder many years ago, 
making access to the way difficult but not impossible (R-127, i2m 
The pictorial evidence and testimony portray the right of way 
-8-
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
largely impassable foL the last several years. Treseder never 
complained to the power company about its poles in his easement 
prior to 1976 (R-132) nor to anyone else about its condition 
(R-134). 
The issue of abandonment is factual, not legal. 25 
Am. Jur. 2d Easements, s 103. The court will determine inten-
tion by all of the relevant evidence, and if there is evidence 
to support it, the trial court, as finder of the facts, will be 
upheld. Jensen v. Brooks, Nev. 1973, 503 P. 2d 1224; Flanagan 
v. San Marcos, supra. 
An easement, because of its very nature as a burden 
upon land, is subject to abandonment more than any other interest 
in property, Restatement, Property, § 504 (a): 
Rationale. This Section indicates that ease-
ments may be abandoned more readily than can 
most interests in land. That there is an 
ownership ready to take the benefit resulting 
from an abandonment of an easement is the 
probable explanation of the tolerance of the 
law toward the abandonment of such interests. 
In many cases, of which the ownership of land 
in fee is an example, an abandonment, if 
permitted, would result in a void in the 
ownership of the affected thing, the filling 
of which would be largely a question of 
chance and would probably produce grave un-
certainty of title. In such cases, abandonment, 
if permitted at all, is permitted only under 
rules stricter than those which prevail in 
the case of the abandonment of easements. 
Moreover, the abandonment of an easement, if 
it produces an extinguishment, will not in-
frequently result in an increased total use 
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of the servi~nt tenement since the uses prevented 
by the easement may be greater or more productive 
than any which can be made under it. 
Ex. 15-P is a close photograph of the board fence built 
by Treseder in 1964, some 8 years after the end of coal deliveries. 
It is seen to be a heavy, sturdy fence indeed, with no gate. 
The testimony is that a 13 foot long by 6 foot high segment 
of it can be removed by pulling out the nails attaching it 
to the posts, and physically carrying it away. It is apparently 
possible, but difficult for one man to do it. Gateway witnesses 
had never seen the fence other than intact. 
The significance of such evidence is noted in Dahnken 
v. George Romney & Sons, supra, in a somewhat similar factual 
setting: 
Under the circumstances of this case Romney's 
construction or approval of the construction 
of the Arthur Frank 1941 addition which has 
no door in the west wall opening on segment "A" 
is strong evidence of abandonment of segment 
"A" as an easement appurtenant to the Romney 
property. {Underlining added). 
The Supreme Court noted a door in the south wall however, 
giving access to segment "A", and as there was !12. other evidence 
of abandonment, upheld the trial court finding against abandon-
ment. The Supreme Court went on to say: 
However, there are in this case no equitable 
issues; therefore, it must be considered as 
an action at law. Babcock v. Dangerfield, 
98 Utah 10, P. 2d 862; Norback v. Board of 
-10-
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Directors, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339. Our 
review in law cases is limited to the deter-
mination of whether or not there is competent 
evidence to support the judgment of the trial 
court. 
Despite Treseder's claim he had no intent to abandon, 
the evidence of non-use, together with other evidence incon-
sistent with continued use and ownership of the easement, fully 
supports the trial court holding of abandonment. 
POINT TWO 
THE CHANGE OF CONDITIONS SINCE CREATION OF THE 
EASEMENT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
When the easement was created, it was to service the 
rear of the 6 lots and houses, particularly by coal delivery to 
the storage sheds in the rear. The 2 entrances, and U-shape of 
the easement provided convenient access for this purpose up 
until the advent of natural gas in about 1956 (R-138). With 
the change, usage of the way became infrequent and irregular 
(R-49). This is accented by Treseders' act in putting up the 
high, heavy fence that makes the property almost inaccessible 
from the way (R-38). With the removal of the 4 railroad houses, 
there is no reason for Treseder to ever use the way to the west 
of his property. His access to Doxey is closer and more con-
venient to the east - which way is unimpaired by the court's 
ruling. 
The trial court found the abandoned portion of the 
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easement had no econon1ic value to T d h rese er ot er than to force 
Gateway to pay an excessive price to be able to use property 
it now owns (R-39) • 
We do not propose to this court adoption of a private 
form of eminent domain whereby one landowner can obtain property 
rights held by others simply on the basis he needs the property 
more or will put it to better use. That is, of course, the 
function of the market place, and in the market place, there 
is no rule of law that says a seller of land or property rights 
must be reasonable. 
However, there is a strong body of cases recognizing 
property rights can be changed, or lost, by reason of changed 
conditions. This is called the "cessation of purpose" doctrine, 
and is perhaps best set out in Hudson v. American Oil Co., 152 
F. Supp. 757, D.C. Va. 1957; affd. 253 F. 2d 27, 4th Cir. 1957. 
There a deeded easement was held by several homeowners over 
Defendant's lands. The easement led from the homes to a public 
highway. The highway was thereafter vacated, resulting in the 
easement still existing but leading nowhere, just ending where 
the public road used to be. The homeowners had alternate routes 
to use to get where they wanted to go, but as here, sought to 
prohibit commercial use of the property, asserting the right 
of way still valid. The court rejected their position, and 
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declared the deeded easement lost: 
Minor on real property has long been recognized 
as an authority in Virginia for land problems. 
In the Second Edition, 1928, Vol. 1, § 106-107, 
pp. 145-146, the seven methods of extinguishing 
an easement are referred to and as to the first 
named method, it is said: 
Easements once created may be extinguished 
in the following ways: 
(1) By a cessation of the purposes 
for which the easement was created; 
* * * 
If the particular purpose for which the 
easement is granted isfulfilled or 
otherwise ceases to exist, the ease-
ment also falls to the ground. 
In determining questions of this 
sort, the terms of the grant, or, 
if it be implied, the circumstances 
for which the implication arises, 
are to be looked to in order to 
ascertain the scope and extent of 
the easement* * * 
Such is the rule set forth in 17 Am. Jur. Easements 
§ 137, p. 1023, and 28 C.J.S. Easements§ 54 a, p. 
718. Cases from other states similarly support 
this view. Holden v. Palitz, 2 Misc. 2d 433, 
154 N.Y.S. 2d 302 {involving the extinguishment 
of an easement by reason of the abandonment and 
relocation of a street); McGiffin v. City of 
Gatlinburg, 195 Tenn. 396, 260 s.w. 2d 152; 
Makepeace Bros., Inc. v. Town of Barnstable, 
292 Mass. 518, 198 N.E. 922; Central Wharf & Wet 
Dock Corp. v. Proprietors of India Wharf, 123 Mass. 
567; Hancock v. Wentworth, 5 Mete., Mass. 446; 
Town of Freedom v. Norris, 128 Ind. 377, 27 N.E. 869; 
Beim v. Carlson, 209 Iowa, 227 N.W. 421. Indeed, in 
complainants' brief no authorities are cited to the 
contrary. 
It is elementary that an easement is one of the rights 
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which may be extinguished or destroyed by act of 
God, operation of law, or act of the party. 
Washburn on Easements and Servitudes, 4 Ed., 
pp. 699-703. As is said in Tiffany on Real 
Property, 3rd Ed., Vol 3, § 817, pp. 368-369: 
It has been said that when an easement 
is created for a particular purpose, it 
comes to an end upon a cessation of that 
purpose, which means, apparently, that 
an easement which is created to endure 
only so long as a particular purpose 
is subserved by its exercise, comes to 
an end which it can no longer subserve 
such purpose. The question then is, 
in each case, what is the particular 
purpose to be subserved by the ease-
ment, and this, in the case of an 
easement created by grant, is a 
question of intention. 
The Virginia Supreme Court, in the identical fact 
situation, reached the same conclusion, American Oil Co., v. 
Leamon, (Va. 1958) 101 S.E. 2d 540. 
Siferd v. Stambor, 214 N.E.2106, Ohio 1966, approved 
this same doctrine on a party-wall easement: 
If it is unreasonable to confer upon either 
party the right to arbitrarily terminate it 
at any time, it is equally unreasonable to 
permit either, from sheer obstinacy or mere 
caprice, to insist upon its continuance 
under a material change of the circumstances. 
Also see 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Easements, § 106. 
As earlier noted, this court in Brown v. Oregon Short 
Line, supra, recognized the importance of changing conditions 
on the issue of abandonment. There, as here, the houses served 
-14-
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by the easement had been razed, and industrial usage was made 
of the area formerly used for access to the homes. 
The trial court found, after full argument and briefing 
on the motion for new trial, (R-55, 56, 57): 
(1) The trial findings were supported by the evidence. 
(2) The easement was for delivery of coal and has not 
been used for that purpose since the 1950's. 
(3) The easement has no present value or useful 
purpose to Treseder. 
(4) Treseder has full access for all necessa~ or 
useful purposes with the remaining easement. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit the trial court correctly ruled 
upon the evidence and the law. An easement is a burden upon 
lands; it should not be perpetuated for all time without attending 
some beneficial or useful purpose to the dominant owner. This 
area of easement lost its purpose, became abandoned by the owners, 
and should not continue to burden the property to the west. 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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